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WHEN GREEN INCENTIVES Go PALE:
INVESTMENT ARBITRATION AND RENEWABLE ENERGY
POLICYMAKING
*FERNANDO DIAS SIMOES
1.

INVESTMENT LAW AND RENEWABLE ENERGY

The use of renewable sources of energy, along with the implementation of
eco-friendly technologies, plays a pivotal role in addressing the predicaments
caused by climate change. States, the industry, international organizations, and
other stakeholders have been striving to develop and employ new solutions that
allow a shift from the current model, based on fossil fuel production and
consumption, to one based on low-carbon options,' so as to ensure a sustainable
future. This global quest for greener alternatives led to the emergence of an
international market for renewable energy technologies and equipment. 2 Over the
last decade this market attracted gigantic flows of capital. Foreign direct
investment is particularly welcome as it can not only provide fresh funds but also
induce the transfer of knowledge and technology. 4 From a broader perspective,
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1. See, e.g., ERIC SPIEGEL, NEIL MCARTHUR & ROB NORTON, ENERGY SHIFT: GAMECHANGING OPTIONS FOR FUELING THE FUTURE (2009) - a general discussion about the changing
attitudes towards renewable energy as the technology to create more sustainable living becomes more
prevalent and easily available to the general public and state governments.
2. See generally, RENEWABLE ENERGY: A GLOBAL REVIEW OF TECHNOLOGIES, POLICIES AND

MARKETS (Dirk Assmann et al. eds, 2006), offering an overview of the changes in technologies,
policies and markets towards renewable energy.
3. See, e.g., Omar Ellabban et al., Renewable Energy Resources: Current Status, Future
Prospects and their Enabling Technology, 39 RENEWABLE & SUSTAINABLE ENERGY REv. 748, 758

(2014).
4. Gaetan

Verhoosel,

Foreign Direct Investment and Legal Constraints on Domestic
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foreign investment
development.5

is

a key

component

of any

agenda

for sustainable

The financial viability of investments in renewable energies is frequently
dependent upon public support.6 All over the world, governments have designed
and implemented renewable energy support mechanisms so as to encourage private
7
investment, often in the form of subsidies and incentive tariffs. Among the
8
different available variants, feed-in-tariffs became especially popular. Under this
scheme, the electricity generated from renewable or high-efficiency cogeneration
installations is paid at a fixed minimum price, generally set higher than the market

&

Environmental Policies: Striking a Reasonable Balance Between Stability and Change, 29 LAW
POL'Y INT'L Bus. 451, 452 (1998); see also Anatole Boute, The Potential ContributionofInternational
Investment Protection Law to Combat Climate Change, 27 J. ENERGY & NAT. RESOURCES L. 333,

334-35 (2009) (citing Int'l Inst. For Sustainable Dev. [IISD], Foreign Investment: Making It Work for
Sustainable
Development
6
(Sep.
2002),
https://www.iisd.org/sites/default/files/publications/tradeeeinvestment.pdf [hereinafter The Potential
Contribution];Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Dec.

11, 1997, U.N. Doc FCCC/CP/1997/7/Add.1, 37 I.L.M. 22 (1998); see also Valentina Vadi, Balancing
&

Human Rights, Climate Change and ForeignInvestment Protection, in CLIMATE CHANGE AND HUMAN
RIGHTS: AN INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW PERSPECTIVE 189, 193 (Ottavio Quirico

Mouloud Boumghar eds., 2016).
5. Andrew Newcombe, Sustainable Development and Investment Treaty Law, 8(3) J. OF WORLD
INVESTMENT & TRADE 357 (2007) (citing Agenda 21: Report of the United Nations Conference on

Environment and Development,

1 2.23,

U.N. Doc. A/CONF.15 1/26/Rev. 1, (June 14, 1992); see also

Markus Gehring & Andrew Newcombe, An Introduction to Sustainable Development in World
Investment Law, in 30 SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN WORLD INVESTMENT LAW 3, 9 (Marie-Claire
Segger et al. eds., 2011).
6. WORLD BANK, INCLUSIVE GREEN GROWTH: THE PATHWAY TO SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT

20-22
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTSDNET/Resources/InclusiveGreenGrowth
7.

See,

(2012),
May 2012.pdf.

e.g., Richard L. Ottinger & Rebecca Williams, Renewable Energy Sources for

Development, 32 ENVTL. L. 331, 359-67 (2002); Bradford Gentry & Jennifer Ronk, International
Investment Agreements and Investments in Renewable Energy, in FROM BARRIERS TO OPPORTUNITIES:
RENEWABLE ENERGY
ISSUES IN LAW IN POLICY 25, 59-77
(pre-publication draft),
http://environment.yale.edu/publication-series/documents/downloads/0-9/11-03-GentryRonk.pdf;
Richard Ottinger et al., Renewable Energy in National Legislation: Challenges and Opportunities, in
BEYOND THE CARBON ECONOMY: Energy LAW IN TRANSITION 183, 186-206 (Donald Zillman et al.

ed. 2008).
8. See, generally, MIGUEL MENDONQA, FEED-IN TARIFFS: ACCELERATING THE DEPLOYMENT
OF RENEWABLE ENERGY (Routledge ed., 2007); MIGUEL MENDON(A ET AL., POWERING THE GREEN
ECONOMY: THE FEED-IN TARIFF HANDBOOK (Routledge ed., 2010) [hereinafter POWERING THE GREEN
ECONOMY]; WILSON RICKERSON, U.N. ENvT. PROG. REP. ON FEED-IN TARIFFS AS A POLICY
INSTRUMENT FOR PROMOTING RENEWABLE ENERGIES AND GREEN ECONOMIES IN DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES (2012); DAVID JACOBS, RENEWABLE ENERGY POLICY CONVERGENCE IN THE EU: THE
EVOLUTION OF FEED-IN TARIFFS IN GERMANY, SPAIN AND FRANCE (John J. Kirton & Miranda
Schreurs, eds., 2012); TOBY COUTURE ET AL., A POLICYMAKER'S GUIDE TO FEED-IN TARIFF POLICY
at
available
(2010),
LABORATORY
ENERGY
RENEWABLE
NATIONAL
DESIGN,
http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fyl0osti/44849.pdf; ANNE HELD ET AL., FEED-IN SYSTEMS IN GERMANY,
SPAIN

AND

SLOVENIA:

A

COMPARISON,

(Energy

http://www.mresearch.com/pdfs/docket4185/NGll/doc44.pdf.

Econ.

Group

et

al.,

2007),

2017
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price and guaranteed over a specified period of time. 9
Investments in the energy field are highly capital intensive and require a
lengthy payback period.'o Regulatory risks loom large - the possibility that the
rules in force at the moment the investment was made are altered, threaten the
ability of investors to recover and earn a profit on their investments."
Governments may decide to change the regulatory framework once investments
take place and costs are "sunk."l2 Renewable energy support mechanisms are
designed to attract capital flows into the renewable energy market; thus, they play
a central role in determining both the period of time and the rate of return on the
investment. Changes to economic mechanisms are a critical risk factor surrounding
such investments, since the level of public support is the most important element
influencing expected profits." Therefore, investors seek to ensure the stability of
the regulatory framework that underpins their investments and secure protection
from unwarranted policy changes.
In order to attract cross-border investment, states must provide adequate
security and protection to foreign investors, namely through the creation of
adequate regulatory frameworks. These legal instruments generally take two
forms: investment contracts and international investment treaties.1 4 Investment
contracts provide some consistency through the development of stabilization

9.

MENDONCA, supra note 8, at 8. The European Commission describes this mechanism as follows:
'These systems are characterised by a specific price, normally set for a period of around
several years, that must be paid by electricity companies, usually distributors, to domestic

producers of green electricity. The additional costs of these schemes are paid by suppliers in
proportion to their sales volume and are passed through to the power consumers by way of a
premium on the kWh end-user price. These schemes have the advantages of investment

security, the possibility of fine tuning and the promotion of mid- and long-term technologies
Communication from the Commission: The Support of Electricity from Renewable Energy Sources. COM (2005) 627
Final, of 7 December 2005.
10. Yulia Selivanova, The Energy Charter and the InternationalEnergy Governance, 2012
EURO. Y.B. INT'L ECON. L. 307, 315.
11. RORY SULLIVAN & WILLIAM BLYTH, CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY UNCERTAINTY AND THE
ELECTRICITY
INDUSTRY:
IMPLICATIONS AND
UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES,
available
at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2469897 (last visited June 8, 2016); see also Boute,
supra note 4, at 337-38; Nigel Bankes, Decarbonisingthe Economy and InternationalInvestment Law,
30(4) J. OF ENERGY & NAT. RESOURCES LAW 497, 502 (2012).
12. Mario E. Bergara et al., PoliticalInstitutionsand Electric Utility Investment: A Cross-Nation
Analysis, 40(2) CALIF. MGMT. REV. 18, 19 (1998); Ralf Dickel, Impact ofLiberalisationon Investment
Performance in the Power Sector, in ELECTRICITY TRADE IN EUROPE: REVIEW OF THE ECONOMIC AND
REGULATORY CHALLENGES 69, 76 (Janusz Bielecki & Melaku Desta eds., 2004).
13. Boute, supra note 4, at 342; see also Anatole Boute, A ComparativeAnalysis of the European
and Russian Support Schemes for Renewable Energy: Return on European Experience for Russia, 4(2)

J. WORLD ENERGY L. & BUS. 157, 175 (2011) [hereinafter A Comparative Analysis]; ECONOMIST
INTELLIGENCE UNIT, MANAGING THE RISK IN RENEWABLE ENERGY 10-11 (Oct. 2011),
http://digitalresearch.eiu.com/risksandrenewables/report.
14. See, generally, Peter Cameron, In Search of Investment Stability, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK
ON INTERNATIONAL ENERGY LAW 124 (Kim Talus ed., 2014) (discussing the various models of treaties
and contracts for investment in renewable energy and the attempt to find a stabilizing choice).
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clauses,' 5 but often prove inadequate when dealing with sovereign states.' As a
result, international investment agreements have become especially important over
the past few decades. These legal instruments aim to create a "level playing field"
for investments in the energy sector, and minimize non-commercial risks
associated with such investments.' 7 They can help lower regulatory and political
risks, thus boosting investor confidence and increasing international investments
18
into renewable sources of energy.
The association between investment law and the energy market has a long
history, taking into account the global nature of this area of business.19 Like in
many other fields of the economy, the significant increase in foreign investments
into the energy market, which have taken place over the last decade, would have
been more difficult without the existence of a transnational system of substantive
and procedural guarantees. 20 Currently, the international legal framework
governing foreign investments to the energy market consists of a vast network of
international investment agreements supplemented by the general rules of
international law. 21 These agreements include bilateral investment treaties
("BITs"), regional free trade agreements, and sectorial treaties including
investment obligations. 22 While international investment agreements differ in many
important respects, they are composed by two essential elements: first, they
include a set of standards of promotion and protection of foreign investment;
second, they provide for mechanisms on the settlement of any possible disputes
23
between the foreign investor and the host state.

15. See Thomas Waelde & George Ndi, Stabilizing International Investment Commitments:
International Law Versus Contract Interpretation, 31 TEx. INT'L L. J. 215 (1996) (examining
stabilization clauses in international contracts); see also Peter D. Cameron, Stability of Contract in the
International Energy Industry, 27 J. ENERGY & NAT. RESOURCES L. 305 (2009) (continuing the
discussion on the importance of stability clauses in international contracts)[hereinafter Stability of
Contract].
16. Bankes, supra note 11, at 498.
17. Kaj Hobdr, Investment Arbitration and the Energy Charter Treaty, 1(1) J. INT'L. DiSP.
SETTLEMENT 153, 155 (2010).
18. BRADLY CONDON & TAPEN StNHA, THE ROLE OF CLIMATE CHANGE IN GLOBAL ECONOMIC

GOVERNANCE 93 (Oxford Univ. Press ed., 2013).
19. Bankes, supra note 11, at 497.
20.

See

RUDOLF

DOLZER

&

CHRISTOPH

SCHREUER,

PRINCIPLES

OF

INTERNATIONAL

INVESTMENT LAW 23 (Oxford Univ. Press ed., 2008).
21. See ANDREW NEWCOMBE & LLUiS PARADELL, LAW AND PRACTICE OF INVESTMENT
TREATIES: STANDARDS OF TREATMENT 448-49 (Kluwer L. Int'l ed., 2009).

22. Examples of BITs include, e.g., US-China BIT, US-Germany BIT, US-UK BIT. Examples of
Regional FTAs include, e.g., NAFTA, CAFTA, ASEAN FTA, EU FTA, etc. Examples of sectorial
treaties including investment obligations include, e.g., ECT, WTO, MAI.
23. See e.g., Christoph Schreuer, Investments, InternationalProtection, MPEPIL 1533,

11

13-15,

31, 44, 54, 110-112 (June 2013), http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law9780199231690-e1533;

see

also,

Marie-France

Houde,

Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment in

InternationalInvestment Law 2-3, 11, 13 (Org. Econ. Cooperation & Dev. Publishing, Working Paper
No. 2004/02, Sep. 2004), http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/518757021651; see also, Lise Johnson, Lisa Sachs
& Jeffrey Sachs, Investor-State Dispute Settlement Public Interest and U.S. Domestic Law, 3-4, 8, 16

(Colum.

CIr.

Sustainable

Inv.,

Working

Paper,

May

2015),

2017
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Investment agreements are a form of international law that creates a series of
obligations owed by the host state towards foreign investors.2 4 The numbers of
BITs and multilateral agreements entering into force have increased throughout the
past few decades.25 The Energy Charter Treaty26 ("ECT"), a multilateral treaty
signed in 1994 and entered into force in 1998, that establishes a legal framework to
promote long-term cooperation in the energy field, is especially relevant. 27 The
ECT currently has 54 member-states. 2 8 The ECT's investment provisions build
upon the content of BITs as they have developed during the last half-century. 29

http://ccsi.columbia.edu/files/201 5/05/Investor-State-Dispute-Settlement-Public-Interest-and-U.S.-

Domestic-Law-FINAL-May-1 9-8.pdf.
24. See, e.g., RUDOLF DOLZER & MARGRETE STEVENS, BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES 58-

66, 119-20 (Martinus Nijhoff Publ. ed., 1995); DOLZER, supra note 20; NEWCOMBE, supra note 21, at
449;

M. SORNARAJAH,

THE INTERNATIONAL

LAW

ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT

90-91,

101,

119

(Cambridge Univ. Press 3rd ed., 2010); JESWALD SALACUSE, THE LAW OF INVESTMENT TREATIES 191,

285, 353 (Oxford Univ. Press 2nd ed., 2015).
25. International
Investment
Agreement
Navigator,
UNCTAD
(2015),
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IlA (reports there were less than 500 investment agreements
prior to 1980. Today there are over 3,000).

26. The Energy CharterTreaty, 34 I.L.M. 360 (Dec. 17, 1994) [hereinafter ECT].
27. Id. at art. 3, 9.
28. See Hobdr, supra note 17, at 154-55; Selivanova, supra note 10 (general discussion of the
ECT and its framework in handling disputes); THE LEGAL COUNSEL OF THE IEA, THE ENERGY
CHARTER TREATY: A DESCRIPTION OF ITS PROVISIONS (Int'l Energy Agency et al., 1994); JULIA DORE,
THE ENERGY CHARTER TREATY: ORIGINS, AIMS, AND PROSPECTS xiv (Royal Inst. Int'l AfE ed., 1995)(
offering a detailed description of the ECT); THE ENERGY CHARTER TREATY: AN EAST-WEST
GATEWAY FOR INVESTMENT AND TRADE (Thomas Wilde ed., 1996); THOMAS WALDE, SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT AND THE 1994 ENERGY CHARTER TREATY (Univ. of Dundee et al. ed., 1997); MIRIAN
OMALU, NAFTA AND THE ENERGY CHARTER TREATY: COMPLIANCE WITH, IMPLEMENTATION, AND

EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERNATIONAL

INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS (Seymour J Rubin & Dean C.

Alexander eds., 1999); ENERGY CHARTER SECRETARIAT, THE ENERGY CHARTER TREATY: A READER'S

GUIDE 8 (Int'l Energy Charter, 2002); ENERGY CHARTER SECRETARIAT, THE ENERGY CHARTER
TREATY

AND

RELATED

DOCUMENTS:

A

LEGAL

FRAMEWORK

FOR

INTERNATIONAL

ENERGY

COOPERATION (Int'l Energy Charter, 2004), http://www.ena.It/pdfai/Treaty.pdf; see also Andrei
Konoplyanik & Thomas Wllde, Energy Charter Treaty and Its Role in InternationalEnergy, 24 J.
ENERGY NAT. RESOURCES L. 523, 542 (2006) (discussing the number of members that are part of
international organizations); see also Justin D'Agostino & Oliver Jones, Energy Charter Treaty: A Step
Towards Consistency in InternationalInvestment Arbitration, 25 J. ENERGY NAT. RESOURCES L. 225,
237 (2007) (discussing the membership of the ECT); INVESTMENT ARBITRATION AND THE ENERGY
CHARTER TREATY (Graham Coop & Clarisse Ribeiro eds., 2008); HAMSU YAHAYA, MULTILATERAL
INVESTMENT

TREATIES:

IS

THE ENERGY CHARTER

TREATY

AN

EFFECTIVE INSTRUMENT

FOR

PROTECTING INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENTS? (Grin Verlag et al., eds., 2009); ENERGY DISPUTE
RESOLUTION: INVESTMENT PROTECTION, TRANSIT AND THE ENERGY CHARTER TREATY (Graham Coop
ed., 2011); THOMAS ROE & MATTIHEW HAPPOLD, SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENTS DISPUTES UNDER THE

&

ENERGY CHARTER TREATY (James Dingemans ed., 2011); Yulia Selivanova, The Energy Charter and
the InternationalEnergy Governance, reprinted in REGULATION OF ENERGY IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE
LAW: WTO, NAFTA AND ENERGY CHARTER 373 (Yulia Selivanova et al. eds., 2011) (discussion of the
ECT and the governance between the members); Tarcisio Gazzini, Energy Charter Treaty:
Achievements, Challenges and Perspectives, in FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE ENERGY SECTOR:
BALANCING PRIVATE AND PUBLIC INTERESTS 105 (Eric de Brabandere & Tarcisio Gazzini, Brill

Nijhoff, eds., vol. 2, 2014).
29. See Hob6r, supranote 17, at 155.
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While there are differences between the scope and content of the different legal
instruments, there is a shared core content: they normally include the obligation to
treat foreign investors fairly and equitably; provide foreign investors full protection
and security; and not to expropriate foreign investment except under certain
conditions, including the payment of compensation.30 Besides including a set of
standards of promotion and protection of foreign investments, international
investment agreements also contain procedural protections. They typically include
dispute resolution clauses that enable foreign investors to initiate arbitration
t
proceedings against the host state, known as "investor-state arbitrations."" For
instance, Article 26 of the ECT provides investors with the opportunity to file
arbitration claims directly against member-states for violations of protections
under the treaty. 32 The investor is given the option of choosing among:
a) Arbitration before the International Centre for Settlement of Investment
Disputes (ICSID). Established pursuant to the Convention on the Settlement of
Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of other States (ICSID
Convention), if the contracting party of the investor and the contracting party to the
dispute are both parties to the ICSID Convention, or under the rules governing the
Additional Facility of the ICSID, if the contracting party of the investor or the
33
contracting party to the dispute, but not both, is a party to the ICSID Convention;
b) Arbitration under the Arbitration Institute of Stockholm Chamber of
Commerce Rules;34 or

c) ad hoc arbitrationunder the Rules of the United Nations Commission on
International Trade Law (UNCITRAL Rules). In such disputes, the foreign investor
brings a claim before the arbitral tribunal alleging that certain acts, or omissions of

30.

See NEWCOMBE ET AL., supra note 21, at 147.

31. See, generally, ARBITRATING FOREIGN

INVESTMENT

DISPUTES:

PROCEDURAL

AND

SUBSTANTIVE LEGAL ASPECTS (Norbert Horn et al. eds., vol. 19, 2004) (overview of arbitration on the

international level with foreign investors); INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND ARBITRATION:
LEADING CASES FROM THE ICSID, NAFTA, BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES AND CUSTOMARY
INTERNATIONAL LAW (Todd Weiler ed., 2005); CAMPBELL MCLACHLAN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT ARBITRATION: SUBSTANTIVE PRINCIPLES (Loukas Mistelis et al. eds., 2007);
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT, PROTECTION AND ARBITRATION: THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL
PERSPECTIVES (Christian Tietje ed., 2008); CHRISTOPHER DUGAN ET AL., INVESTOR-STATE
ARBITRATION (Oxford Univ. Press ed., 2008); MARIEL DLMSEY, THE RESOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENTS DISPUTES: CHALLENGES AND SOLUTIONS (Ingeborg Schwenzer ed., vol. 1, 2008);
ZACHARY DOUGLAS, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF INVESTMENT CLAIMS (Cambridge Univ. Press ed.,
2009); THE FUTURE OF INVESTMENT ARBITRATION (Catherine Rogers & Roger Alford eds., 2009);
EVOLUTION IN INVESTMENT TREATY LAW AND ARBITRATION (Chester Brown & Kate Miles eds.,
2011); THOMAS WEBSTER, HANDBOOK OF INVESTMENT ARBITRATION (Sweet & Maxwell ed., 2012);
ARBITRATION UNDER INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS: A GUIDE TO THE KEY ISSUES (Katia
Yannaca-Small ed., 2010); TONY COLE, THE STRUCTURE OF INVESTMENT ARBITRATION (Routledge
ed., 2013); LITIGATING INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT DISPUTES: A PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE (Chiara
Giorgetti ed., 2014); JOHAN BILLIET ET AL., INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENTS ARBITRATION: A
PRACTICAL HANDBOOK (Maklu Pub. ed., 2016).

32. ECT, supra note 26, art. 26(4)(a)(ii).
33. ECT, supra note 26, art. 26(4)(c).
34. ECT, supra note 26, art. 26.

2017
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organs of the central government or local authorities, resulted in damages to his
investment or violate the host state's obligations under an international investment
agreement. If the host state is a party to the ECT or another international
investment treaty and has consented to investor-state arbitration, the arbitral
tribunal has jurisdiction to hear the claims of the investor against the state for
violation of its obligations under the treaty.
II.

DISPUTES

OVER CHANGES IN RENEWABLE ENERGY SUPPORT MECHANISMS

Over the years, arbitration has become the principal technique for resolving
disputes in the energy sector. International investments in energy represent a
huge percentage of overall investments and, consequently, a substantial part of
international commercial and investment disputes relates to this field. Arbitration
increases are well evidenced by the new era of "mega cases"38 in the oil and gas
industries.3 9 While billion dollar claims were virtually unheard of twenty years
ago, they are now ordinary.40 As a result, energy-related dispute resolution, in
particular international arbitration, is a growing area of practical and academic
interest. 41 Specifically in the area of investor-state arbitration, Whitsitt and
Bankes4 2 arrange energy-related disputes into four categories: disputes involving
significant economic or political structural adjustment in the host state; disputes
triggered by the efforts of states seeking to claim an enhanced share of resource
rents; disputes in which states seek to enhance the environmental or social
regulatory regime within which existing investments operate; and disputes where
the states seek to withdraw economic support mechanisms for a policy measure
that was introduced to support a particular energy or environmental policy. 43
The number of disputes fitting the latter category surged in the last two
years." With a view to increasing the production of clean energy, many countries

35.

Michael Feit, Responsibility of the State under InternationalLaw for the Breach of Contract

Committed by a State-OwnedEntity, 28 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 142, 168-176 (2010); see also Catherine
Yannaca-Small, Definition of Investor and Investment in InternationalInvestment Agreements, in
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW: UNDERSTANDING CONCEPTS AND TRACKING INNOVATIONS 7-100

(OECD Publishing ed. 2008).
36.

A. Timothy Martin, DisputeResolution in the InternationalEnergy Sector. An Overview, 4(4)

J. WORLD ENERGY L. BUS. 332, 339 (2011).
37.

ERIC DE BRABANDERE, THE SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES IN THE ENERGY SECTOR

130 (Eric de Brabandere & Tarcisio Gazzini eds., vol. 2, 2014) (citing Martin, supranote 36).
38. George Kahale, III, Is Investor-State Arbitration Broken? 9 TRANSNAT'L DISP. MGMT. 1, 2832 (2012); see also Julian Cardenas Garcia, The Era ofPetroleumArbitration Mega Cases, 35 HOUS. J.

INT'L L. 537 (2013) (discussing the Occidental v. Ecuador case in regard to mega cases).
39. Kahale, supranote 38, at 31.
40. Kahale, supranote 38, at 28; Garcia, supra note 38.
41. Alexandra Wawryk, InternationalEnergy Law: an Emerging Academic Discipline, in LAW
AS CHANGE: ENGAGING WITH THE LIFE AND SCHOLARSHIP OF ADRIAN BRADBROOK 223, 224-25, 228

(Paul Babie & Paul Leadbeter eds., 2014).
42. Elizabeth Whitsitt & Nigel Bankes, The Evolution of InternationalInvestment Law and Its

Application to the Energy Sector, 51 ALTA. L. REV. 207, 211 (2013).
43. Id. at 211, 213.
44. Id. at 213.
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introduced incentives to encourage investment in the renewable energy sector. As
originally intended, the introduction of these mechanisms led a substantial number
46
of companies and individuals making investments in this field. While economic
incentives attracted significant amounts of investment, several countries have
began reducing or eliminating them. Since 2008, Spain has introduced several
measures affecting the renewable energy sector. 47 In 2010, the Spanish government
reduced feed-in tariffs in the solar energy sector and enacted measures that
substantially cut some incentives granted to wind generation. Subsequently, the
Spanish government imposed a limit on the feed-in tariffs of 25 years and imposed
an annual cap on the number of hours of electricity the investors could sell at the
above-market rates.4 8
In 2013, the Spanish government abrogated the feed-in tariff system
altogether. 4 9 Fourteen domestic producers filed a suit against the Spanish
government arguing that such measures generated legal uncertainty and had
retrospective nature. 50 In a ruling handed down in January 2014, the Spanish
Supreme Court rejected the claims holding that investors had assumed a regulatory
risk, were highly sophisticated, and had access to quality technical and legal

45. Id.
46. See Onno Kuik & Sabine Fuss, Renewables in the Energy Market: A Financial-Technological
Analysis Considering Risk and Policy Options, in FINANCIAL ASPECTS IN ENERGY: A EUROPEAN
PERSPECTIVE 33 (Andr6 Dorsman et al. eds., 2011).

47. See Arif Hyder Ali, In the Eye of the Storm: Spain's Nexus to Investment Disputes, 18 SPAIN
ARB. REV. 5 (2013); PABLO DEL Rio & PERE MIR-ARTIGUES, A CAUTIONARY TALE: SPAIN'S SOLAR

PV INVESTMENT BUBBLE I (Global Subsidies Initiative & Int'l Inst. for Sustainable Dev., Feb. 2014),
https://www.iisd.org/gsi/sites/default/files/rens_ct spain.pdf; Mejia, The Protection of Legitimate
Expectations and Regulatory Change: The Spanish Case, 21 SPAIN ARB. REV. 113 (2014); CECILIA
OLIVET & PIA EBERHARDT, PROFITING FROM CRISIS: How CORPORATIONS AND LAWYERS ARE
SCAVENGING PROFITS FROM EUROPE'S CRISIS COUNTRIES 7, 26-31 (The Transnat'l Inst. Mar. 7, 2014),

https://corporateeurope.org/sites/default/files/profiting-from-crisis_0.pdf; Jose Luis Iriarte & Lupicinio
Rodriguez, The increasing number and methods of arbitration claims brought against Spain for its
WORLD
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http://www.weil.com/~/media/files/pdfs/WWARNewsletter

(2014),
26
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Spring20l4.pdf; Charles Patrizia et al.,

Investment Disputes Involving the Renewable Energy Industry Under the Energy Charter Treaty, in
THE GUIDE TO ENERGY ARBITRATIONS 73, 74-76 (J. William Rowley et al. eds., 2015); Joseph M.

&

Tirado, Renewable Energy Claims Under the Energy Charter Treaty: An Overview, 13(3) OIL GAS

ENERGY L. INTEL. 1, 6-7 (2015); Daniel Behn & Ole Kristian Fauchald, Governments Under Cross-

fire? Renewable Energy and InternationalEconomic Tribunals, 12(2) MANCHESTER J. INT'L ECON. L.
117, 121-22 (2015); Thomas Dromgool & Daniel Enguix, The Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard
and the Revocation of Feed in Tariffs - Foreign Renewable Energy Investments in Crisis-StruckSpain,
in LEGAL ASPECTS OF SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: HORIZONTAL AND SECTORIAL POLICY ISSUES

389, 391-400 (Volker Mauerhofer ed.,2016); Daniel Behn et al., PromotingRenewable Energy in the
EU: Shifiing Trends in Member State Policy Space 9-10 (PluriCourts, Working Paper No. 15-23,
2015), http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfin?abstract-id=2704333.
48. Joseph Tirado & Jerry Bloom, Renewable Energy Reforms in Europe: Growing Threats to
International Investors, LEXOLOGY (2014), http://cdn2.winston.com/images/content/8/4/v2/84476/IA-

RenewableEnergyReformEurope-6-9-2014.pdf.
49. Id.
50. Id.; see also OLIVET, supranote 47, at 6-7, 26, 28, 30-31.
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advice."' In the court's view, investors were not entitled to expect that the

economic regime regulating the retribution of their investments would remain
unchanged. 52 In June 2016, the Spanish Supreme Court rendered another decision,
holding that the 2014 government decree reducing subsidies in the renewable
energy sector did not violate the Spanish Constitution or European Union law. 5
Other European governments have enacted legislative measures, which have
impacted the renewable energy market. In 2011, the Czech Republic introduced a
new 26% retroactive tax on all producers of solar energy and modified its feed-in
tariffs policy. 54 Between 2010 and 2013, the Italian government reduced feed-in
tariffs and eliminated incentives granted to photovoltaic plants situated in
agricultural land. In June 2013, the Romanian Government excluded some
photovoltaic plants from the government's support scheme. 56 In 2014, Bulgaria
imposed a 20% fee on income from wind and solar power installations and limited
the volume of electricity purchased at feed-in tariff rates.5 7 Other countries like
Slovakia, Latvia, Greece, Belgium, the United Kingdom, and France have also
made significant modifications to their support schemes.5 8
National policies for the promotion of renewable energy generation have been
introduced by European states in an effort to achieve national binding targets
mandated under the Renewable Energy Directive.5 9 Economic support mechanisms
were seen as indispensable to kick-start investments in renewable energies due to
the high cost of production. While renewable energy promotion is at the very heart
of the European Union's environmental policy,6 0 the European Union has also
been changing its approach to economic support mechanisms. The Communication
from the European Commission "Guidelines on State Aid for Environmental
Protection and Energy 2014-2020," published in 2014, recommends that subsidies
and exemptions become phased out in a degressive way.61

51.

See Supreme Court Backs Cuts to the Solar Power Producers'Earnings, EL PAis (Jan. 21,

2014), http://elpais.com/elpais/2014/01/21/inenglish/1390306709_143350.html; Iriarte, supra note 47,
at 27.
52. Iriarte, supra 47, at 29.
53. See Reyes Rinc6n, Spain's Supreme Court Backs Renewable Energy Cuts, EL PAiS (June 2,
2016),
http://elpais.com/elpais/2016/06/02/inenglish/1464860925_523010.html?idextemo_rsoc=LKCC.
54. See Anna De Luca, Withdrawing Incentives to Attract FDI: Can Host Countriesput the Genie
Back in the Bottle?, COLUMBIA U. ACAD. COMMONS 2 (Issue No. 125, 2014),
http://ccsi.columbia.edu/files/2013/10/No-125-De-Luca-FINAL.pdf; Behn & Fauchald, supra note 47,
at 123-124; Patrizia et al., supra note 47, at 76-77; Tirado, supra note 47, at 8; Behn, supra note 47, at
11-12.
55. Tirado & Bloom, supra note 48, at 8-11; Behn, supra note 47, at 12-14.
56. Tirado & Bloom, supra note 48.
57. Angel Bangachev, New Rules for Wind and Solar Energy Producersin Bulgaria, LEXOLOGY
(Jan.
9,
2014),
http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g-8e409dc6-4c5e-470d-95994b7feac75905; Vadi, supranote 4, at 197.
58. Behn, supra note 47, at 6.
59. Council Directive 2009/28/EC, 2009 O.J. (L 140) 16-62.
60. Dromgool & Enguix, supranote 47, at 390.
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Several European countries have made legislative changes to their renewable
energy markets, which has resulted in the surfacing of numerous arbitral
proceedings where investors claim that such measures breach the protection
afforded by international investment agreements, namely the ECT. 62 According to
figures from the ICSID, as of December 31, 2015, 17% of all ICSID cases
regarded electric power and other sources of energy.6 3 Forty two percent of the
new cases registered in 2015 related to electric power and other sources of energy,
with the ECT being the legal instrument invoked in 33% of the cases.M In at least
twenty cases initiated in 2015, investors challenged legislative reforms in the
renewable energy sector.6 5 As of June 15, 2016, 43 cases had been initiated
relating to changes in economic support programs in the renewable energy
market.66 This number, however, may not be totally accurate. Arbitral proceedings

&

(June 28, 2014).
62. See Tirado & Bloom, supranote 48; see also Patrizia,supra note 47, at 32-33.
(2016),
63. ICSID Secretariat, The ICSID Caseload - Statistics, Issue 2016-1
https://icsid.worldbank.org/apps/icsidweb/resources/pages/icsid-caseload-statistics.aspx.
64. Id. at 26.
65. UNCTAD, Investor-State Dispute Settlement: Review of Developments in 2015, 6 (June 8,
2016), http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.orgUpload/ISDS%201ssues%2ONote%202016.pdf.
66. Cases administered by the ICSID: EVN AG v. Republic of Bulgaria, ICSID Case No.
ARB/13/17 (Dec. 2, 2013); RREEF Infrastructure (G.P.) Limited & RREEF Pan-European
Infrastructure Two Lux S.A.r.l. v. Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/13/30 (June 6, 2016); Antin
Infrastructure Services Luxembourg S.A.r.l. & Antin Energia Termosolar B.V. v. Kingdom of Spain,
ICSID Case No. ARB/13/31(Aug. 7, 2014); Eiser Infrastructure Limited & Energia Solar Luxembourg
S.A.r.l. v. Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/13/36 (July 28, 2014); Masdar Solar & Wind
Cooperatief U.A. v. Kingdom of Spain ICSID Case No. ARB/14/1(July 18, 2014); Blusun S.A., JeanPierre Lecorcier & Michael Stein v. Italian Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/14/3 (June 12, 2014);
NextEra Energy Global Holdings B.V. & NextEra Energy Spain Holdings B.V. v. Kingdom of Spain
ICSID Case No. ARB/14/11 (Jan. 23, 2015); InfraRed Environmental Infrastructure GP Limited
others v. Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/14/12 (Nov. 26, 2014); RENERGY S.A.r.l. v.
Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/14/18 (Feb. 13, 2015); RWE Innogy GmbH & RWE Innogy
Aersa S.A.U. v. Kingdom of Spain ICSID Case No. ARB/14/34 (Nov. 4, 2015); Stadtwerke Miinchen
GmbH, RWE Innogy GmbH, & others v. Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/15/1 (Dec. 16,
2015); STEAG GmbH v. Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/15/4 (Oct. 25, 2016); 9REN
Holding S.a.r.1 v. Kingdom of Spain, ICS[D Case No. ARB/15/15 (Feb. 8, 2016); BayWa r.e.
Renewable Energy GmbH & BayWa r.e. Asset Holding GmbH v. Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No.
ARB/15/16 (Nov. 6, 2015); ENERGO-PRO a.s. v. Republic of Bulgaria, ICSID Case No. ARB/15/19
(Feb. 9, 2016); Cube Infrastructure Fund SICAV & others v. Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No.
ARB/15/20 (Dec. 8, 2015); Mathias Kruck & others v. Kingdom of Spain ICSID Case No. ARB/15/23
(Jan. 19, 2016); KS Invest GmbH & TLS Invest GmbH v. Kingdom of Spain ICSID Case No.
ARB/15/25 (Dec. 7, 2015); JGC Corporation v. Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/15/27 (Jan. 4,
2016); Cavalum SGPS, S.A. v. Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/15/34 (Jan. 22, 2016); E.ON
Finanzanlagen GmbH & E.ON Iberia Holding GmbH v. Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No.
ARB/15/35 (Jan. 21, 2016); OperaFund Eco-Invest SICAV PLC & Schwab Holding AG v. Kingdom of
Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/15/36 (Mar. 28, 2016); Silver Ridge Power BV v. Italian Republic, ICSID
Case No. ARB/15/37 (Pending until Jan. 16, 2017); SolEs Badajoz GmbH v. Kingdom of Spain, ICSID
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(May 18, 2016); Hydro Energy 1 S.A.r.l. & Hydroxana Sweden AB v. Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case
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may be administered by institutions that, differently from the ICSID, do not
disclose the initiation of proceedings publicly. Furthermore, they may also be
conducted ad-hoc, with no supervising institution. Due to this lack of transparency,
the exact number of disputes already initiated is unknown and the legal basis on
which such claims are made is not totally clear. In any case, it is safe to say that we
are witnessing a boom in renewable energy arbitration under the ECT, particularly
in Europe. The implementation of the "Guidelines on State Aid for Environmental
Protection and Energy 2014-2020" may create further tension between national,
European and international legal systems and result in additional arbitral
proceeding against member states in the near future. 67
The anatomy of these cases is substantially different from the prototype of
energy-related disputes submitted to arbitration in the past. For years, states have
enacted regulations to protect the environment by limiting environmentally
detrimental investments. Commentators have expressed concern that investors
could initiate arbitral proceedings, claiming that climate-related regulatory
measures breached relevant investment treaty provisions.6 9 Such cases posed a risk

&

&
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that international investment agreements could have a constraining effect
("regulatory chill") on climate change mitigation measures and restrain the host70
The adoption of climate change-related
state's policy space significantly.
regulatory measures can affect the economic interests of private actors, by
requiring (or not requiring) technological upgrades and specific economic
behavior.7 1 Foreign investors can argue that such measures violate investment
treaty provisions, in particular, the prohibition of unlawful expropriation, and the
fair and equitable treatment standard.7 2
Differently, the new wave of disputes refers to cases where states are reducing
or eliminating the economic incentives which they introduced years ago in order to
73
lure investments into the renewable energy market. Investors are complaining
that such regulatory changes diminish or exhaust the commercial viability of their
investments. 74 Host states argue that support mechanisms have proven too popular
(and therefore, more expensive than anticipated); that they became too generous
because the production costs for the new technology have decreased significantly;
or that they simply cannot afford these initiatives due to the ongoing financial
crisis. 7 5 The crux of the question is whether investors can seek compensation under

70. See, e.g., Soloway, supra note 68, at 92, 95, 104. ERIC NEUMAYER, GREENING TRADE AND
INVESTMENT: ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION WITHOUT PROTEcTIONISM 68-78 (Earthscan Publ. ed.,
2001); Kevin R. Gray, Foreign Direct Investment And Environmental Impacts - Is The Debate Over?,
11(3) REV. EUR. COMMUNITY & INT'L ENV'T L. 306. 310-11 (2002); Wallace-Bruce, supranote 68, at
195, 211-13; Jacob Werksman, Kevin A. Baumert & Navroz K. Dubash, Will InternationalInvestment
Rules Obstruct Climate Protection Policies? An Examination of the Clean Development Mechanism,
3(1) INT'L ENVTL. AGREEMENTS POL. L. & EcON. 59 (2003)(discussing the Kyoto Protocol and how
disputes are solved both in and outside of court and the effect on the international arena); Ole K.
Fauchald, InternationalInvestment Law and Environmental Protection, 17(1) Y.B. INT'L ENVTL L. 3,
8, 29 (2007); Stephan Schill, Do Investment Treaties Chill Unilateral State Regulation to Mitigate
Climate Change? 24(5) J. INT'L ARB. 469 (2007); Johnson, InternationalInvestment Agreements, supra
note 70, at 11147, 1150, 1152-53; Kate Miles, ArbitratingClimate Change: Regulatory Regimes and
Investor-State Disputes, 1 CLIMATE L. 63 (2010) (discussing the various international mechanisms
implemented to regulate climate change and the conflicts that have arisen between foreign investors and
host-states); Kate Miles, Sustainable Development, National Treatment and Like Circumstances in
Investment Law, in SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN WORLD INVESTMENT LAW 265 (Marie-Claire

Segger et al. eds., 2011); Cristina L. Beharry & Melinda E. Kuritzky, Going Green: Managing the
Environment Through InternationalInvestment Arbitration,30 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 383, 422 (2015);
Albert Cho & Navroz Dubash, Will Investment Rules Shrink Policy Space for Sustainable
Development? Evidence from the Electricity Sector 38 (World Resources Inst., Working Paper, Sep. 5,
2003), http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2003/tradeinvestment rules.pdf; Aaron Cosbey et al., Clean Energy
Investment. Project Synthesis Report 8, 61, 70 INT'L INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV. (July 2008),
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71. Vadi, supra note 4, at 193.
72. Id. at 194; Schill, supra note 70, at 470-76.
73. Patrizia, supra note 47, at 1.
74. De Luca, supra note 54, at 1-2; Behn & Fauchald, supranote 47, at 120.

75. Bankes, supranote 11, at 502; Whitsitt, supra note 42, at 213-14; James Prest, The Future of
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investment treaties when governments encourage investment via economic support
schemes, but decide to reduce or eliminate them after the investment has been
made. Again, we may have a clash between energy-related policies and investment

law. 76
These disputes raise a classic problem in investment arbitration: how to strike
a balance between foreign investors' reliance on the regulations that underpin their
long-term investments and the host state's right to adapt regulations to new
needs.n The introduction of changes to economic support mechanisms typically
involves governmental measures adopted for public purposes, whether for financial
or other reasons.7 8 The host state intervenes as the regulation of energy production,
distribution, and consumption is a key element of national economic law and
policy. 79 The novelty in this new wave of disputes is that challenged measures
work against the protection of the environment, while in the past they were ecofriendly.8 0 The crux of the question is the following: to what extent can investors
expect that the level of incentives granted initially will be protected by investment
treaties throughout the life of the investment?
III. BETWEEN INVESTMENT PROTECTION AND NATIONAL REGULATORY SPACE
Over the last decade, governments around the world have implemented
policies designed to encourage private investment in renewable sources of
energy.8 1 For various reasons, some of them have recently decided to introduce
changes to those policies. Incentives and other benefits are easy to grant but
difficult to withdraw. Economic support mechanisms may be reasonable in the
initial phases of development because of the environmental and social benefits of
renewable energy. However, they also have disadvantages. Feed-in tariffs, for
instance, can lag behind the technology change they create, thus generating
windfall profits and over-subsidizing the renewable industry.82 As a result, the
regulatory framework underpinning these incentives becomes outdated. This leads
to a paradoxical situation: while feed-in tariffs are frequently praised for creating
certainty, they themselves become uncertain.
Trying to adjust to new scenarios, governments may decide to interfere with

Gurdgiev et al. eds., vol. 18, 2016).
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2012).
77. See DOLZER, supra note 20, at 145-49.
78.
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VI1TUALES, supra note 76, at 30, 50; see also Gray, supra note 70, at 311-13.
Markus Krajewski, The Impact of International Investment Agreements on Energy

Regulation, 2012 EuR. Y.B. OF INT'L EcON. L. 343, 345.
80. See Rachel A. Nathanson, The Revocation of Clean-Energy Investment Economic-Support
Systems as Indirect Expropriation Post-Nykomb: A Spanish Case Analysis, 98 IOWA L. REV. 863, 865

(2013).
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(2013).
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the amount and duration of the support mechanism. Feed-in tariffs guarantee
renewable energy producers a fixed price for their energy over a fixed period of
time. 84 Even though such incentives are designed to reduce financial risk, the truth
is that they are not immune from political risk. As a result, relying on this type of
mechanism makes renewable energy investors particularly vulnerable to policy
changes.8' The cases mentioned above illustrate this possibility. While support
schemes may help to attract foreign investments, subsequent changes to regulatory
frameworks affecting foreign investors might be challenged under international
investment law.
International investment agreements impose certain standards regarding the
protection afforded by host states to foreign investors. However, in some
situations, these canons may conflict with the regulatory power of the host state.
The disciplines of international investment law may "chill" governments from
enacting regulations that might affect foreign investments - in the cases under
analysis, by changing the structure of economic incentives that supported
investments in renewable energies. 8 6 Fundamentally, the notion of regulatory chill
suggests that the investment law and arbitration system may impact the normal
course of policy development and implementation. 8 In some circumstances,
governments may fail to modify, enact, or enforce new regulatory measures
because they are afraid of a perceived risk of having to face arbitration
proceedings.
The protection afforded to investors under international investment
agreements is not absolute. Arbitration tribunals have in the past acknowledged the
host state's sovereign right to regulate.8 9 Host states may try to argue that the
substantial modification or withdrawal of economic support mechanisms was
justified by objectives of public policy, namely, the state's right to adapt the level
and duration of support to avoid overcompensation of investments.90 However,
such arguments may be used to disguise attempts to reduce public debt or decrease
energy prices for consumers in advance of upcoming elections, imposing the
9
financial burden on investors.

1

While investor-state arbitral proceedings are generally confidential, making it
difficult to have a clear picture of the claimants' arguments, they will probably
84. COUTURE ET AL., supra note 8, at vii, xi, 7, 11, 19, 22-23, 34, 50.
85. Kim Talus, Introduction: Renewable Energy Disputes in Europe and Beyond: An Overview of
Current Cases, 13(3) OIL GAS & ENERGY L. INTELLIGENCE (2015).

Whitsitt, supra note 42, at 213-14, 223-24.
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See Kyla Tienhaara, Regulatory Chill and the Threat of Arbitration:A View from Political
Science, in EVOLUTION IN INVESTMENT TREATY LAW AND ARBITRATION 806 (Chester Brown & Kate
Miles eds., 2011).
89. Whitsitt, supranote 42, at 215, 219, 229-30.
90. Boute, supra note 4, at 176 (citing Case 201/08, Plantanol GmbH & Co. KG v. Hauptzollamt
Darmstadt 2009 E.C.R. 1-08343); Anatole Boute, Combating Climate Change through Investment
Arbitration, 35 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 613, 648 (2012) (citing Plantanol GmbH & Co. KG v.
Hauptzollamt Darmstadt, 2009 E.C.R. 1-08343) [hereinafter Boute, Combating Climate Change].
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focus on two standards of protection typically found in international investment
agreements: the prohibition of expropriation and the principle of fair and equitable
treatment. 92
Among the different investment disciplines, protection against expropriation
is a principal cause of action for investors.9 3 While the language of treaties varies,
they generally protect investors from measures involving the transfer of title or
outright physical seizure of an investor's property (direct expropriation); but also
from measures that are not considered direct takings but permanently destroy the
economic value of the investment or deprive the owner of its ability to control it in
a meaningful way (indirect expropriations). 94 The possibility of a direct
expropriation seems only plausible in cases where there is a deprivation of a
foreign investor's acquired rights and the transfer of ownership rights to the state
or a third person through the revocation of feed-in tariffs.95 Allegations of indirect
expropriation are much more likely, as indirect expropriation is by far the most
common form of expropriation in international investment law.9 6
However, drawing the line between the right of host state to regulate in the
public interest and indirect expropriation is quite challenging. According to the
"sole effect" doctrine followed by some tribunals, the "effect" of the governmental
action on the investment is the preponderant factor in assessing whether there has
been an expropriation.9 7 From this perspective, the policy objectives pursued by
the challenged regulatory measures do not alter the legal character of the taking,
requiring compensation in any case. Differently, other tribunals have followed the
"police powers" theory, which recognizes the host states' right to regulate in the
public interest and takes this power into account when assessing the impact of
these measures on the investment.9 8 Arbitration panels have taken into account the
nature, objectives, and character of the measures challenged in order to distinguish
between indirect expropriations and valid regulatory interventions of the host state,
which are not subject to compensation.99 Specifically, in the energy sector, recent
decisions have focused on striking a balance between the host state's right to
regulate in the public interest and the protection of investor's rights by

92. De Luca, supra note 54, at 1; Mejia, supra note 47, at 130; Patrizia, supra note 47, at 77.
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incorporating notions of reasonableness or proportionality into the decision making
process.
According to some authors, it might be possible for investors to invoke the
101
This scenario seems more likely in
non-expropriation standard successfully.
cases where the economic support measure is completely eliminated. However, it
can also be argued that feed-in tariffs merely entitle investors to fixed prices and
that these may not be traded independently from the main electricity transaction.
From this perspective, since these incentives are incapable of independent
economic exploitation and investors will likely not lose control of their
102
The
installations, any interference may not be considered expropriation.
revocation of feed-in tariffs will normally not amount to an indirect expropriation,
since the investors usually still retain control of their power plants and receive the
profits of the electricity output.10 3 It is uncertain whether arbitral tribunals will
conclude that changes to support mechanisms deprive investors of the use and
benefit of their investment to such an extent as to constitute an indirect
expropriation.
The threshold for establishing an indirect expropriation is high.' Given the
stringent requirements for the qualification of regulatory measures as "indirect
expropriation", investors will probably turn to the fair and equitable treatment
standard.1 0 5 This is the most frequently invoked standard and also the most
06
Still, the
promising against the revocation of economic support mechanisms.1
content of the fair and equitable treatment standard is contentious and may vary
07
Notwithstanding its
depending on the precise way in which it is expressed.i
100. Whitsitt, supranote 42, at 230.
101. See Thomas Wilde & Kaj Hobdr, The First Energy Charter Treaty Arbitral Award, 5
TRANSNAT'L DISP. MGMT. 15 (2005); Boute, Combating Climate Change, supra note 90, at 631-35;
Iriarte, supra note 47, at 26-29.
102. Boute, Combating Climate Change, supra note 90, at 658; Vyoma Jha, Trends in Investor
Claims Over Feed-in Tariffs For Renewable Energy, INv. TREATY NEWS (July 19, 2012),
https://www.iisd.org/itn/2012/07/19/trends-in-investor-claims-over-feed-in-tariffs-for-renewableenergy.
103. Boute, supranote 4, at 363; Dromgool & Enguix, supra note 47, at 402.
104. Boute, Combating Climate Change, supra note 90, at 631; Bankes, supranote 11, at 507-08.
105. See generally DOLZER, supra note 20, at 130; Catherine Yannaca-Small, Fairand Equitable
Treatment Standard In InternationalInvestment Law (Org. for Econ. Co-operation & Dev., Working

Paper No. 2004/03, 2004); Christoph Schreuer, Fairand Equitable Treatment (FET): Interactions with
Other Standards, in INVESTMENT ARBITRATION AND THE ENERGY CHARTER TREATY 63 (Graham
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elusive nature, arbitral tribunals and commentators generally agree that
transparency, stability, non-discrimination, due process, and the investor's
legitimate expectations are all key ingredients in defining the fair and equitable
standard.ios
Several arbitral tribunals have concluded that the host state has an obligation
to maintain a stable and predictable legal and business framework in line with the
investor's legitimate expectations.10 Legitimate expectations and the protection of
a stable and predictable legal and business environment are closely linked as they
both relate to the investment framework, which investors legitimately expect.no
Two different approaches have been used in arbitral practice to determine when
investor expectations are reasonable."' The first approach requires the host state to
have made clear assurances to the investor regarding the specific business
relationship; under the second, more permissive approach, expectations can be
created based on assurances provided in generally applicable laws of a country,
and more generally, upon the existing framework at the time of the investment.11
The latter interpretation is frequently used in investment claims regarding changes
in a host state's legal framework.1 13 Tribunals will have to analyze the legal nature
of the normative framework establishing incentives.114 Investors may find it more
difficult to obtain protection when their expectations arise out of general legislative
provisions that are not protected from subsequent amendments, and there are no
specific guarantees of stability specifically addressed to investors." 5
The fair and equitable treatment standard provides an important tenet of
investment protection. Investors build their business cases on the basis of these
economic support schemes. Since public support is vital, support schemes and
tariff commitments often constitute the essential foundations of the investment. 1 6
Investors make decisions on the financial viability of the investment relying upon
the implementation of support. incentives by host states. Therefore, it is not
surprising when an investor expects and relies upon the predictability and stability
of these mechanisms.' 17 The modification or withdrawal of support mechanisms

Equitable Treatment: Today's Contours, 12 SANTA CLARA J. INT'L L. 7, 7-33 (2014); Patrick

Dumberry, The Protection of Investor's Legitimate Expectations and the Fairand Equitable Treatment
Standard UnderNAFTA Article 1105, 31(1), J. INT'L ARB. 47,47-49 (2014).
108.

See MCLACHLAN ET AL., supra note 31, at 234; DOLZER, supra note 20, at 119; Andre von

Walter, The Investor's Expectations In International Investment Arbitration, in INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT LAW IN CONTEXT 175 (Christina Knahr & August Reinisch, eds., 2007); Roland KlIger,
'Fairand Equitable Treatment' and Sustainable Development, in SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN
WORLD INVESTMENT LAW 241, 251 (Marie-Claire Segger et al. eds., 2011).
109. Krajewski, supranote 79, at 358-59.
110. Id. at 359; see also DOLZER, supra note 20, at 113.
Ill. DUGAN ET AL., supra note 31, at 513.
112. Id.at513.
113. Whitsitt, supra note 42, at 223-24.
114. Dromgool & Enguix, supra note 47, at 391.
115. De Luca, supranote 54, at 1-2.
116. Boute, supra note 4, at 364.
117. Cameron, supra note 15, at 326; Dromgool & Enguix, supra note 47, at 402.
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might constitute a substantial change of the regulatory conditions and legitimate
expectations contemporary to the investment." 8 In assessing whether the
legitimate expectations of the investor have been met, arbitral tribunals examine
the law at the time when the investment was made and any specific representations
made by the host State to the investor. 119
Another element that arbitral tribunals consider is the investor's own conduct,
namely, whether they diligently assessed the risks associated with their
investment.1 2 0 Investors are under a duty of due diligence to reasonably assess the
risk, including not only the facts surrounding the investment, but also the political,
socioeconomic, cultural, and historical conditions prevailing in the host State.
Thus, the investor's own conduct constitutes a general limitation to his legitimate
expectations.121
Investors should not reasonably expect that the circumstances existing at the
time the investment was made would remain unchanged. Some tribunals have
acknowledged that legal and economic frameworks are not immutable and must
necessarily evolve.1 22 In order to determine whether the frustration of the foreign
investor's expectations is justified and reasonable, the host state's legitimate right
to regulate domestic matters in the public interest must also be taken into
consideration.1 23 From this perspective, the legitimate expectations and the
requirement of stability of the legal framework do not affect the host state's right
to exercise its sovereign regulatory powers, per se.124 In the cases under discussion,
states may invoke their right to adapt their support regimes in order to avoid
overcompensation. 12 The defendant state's right to regulate may establish a
1 26
limitation to the protective scope of the fair and equitable treatment standard.
However, the exercise of the host state's legitimate right to regulate in the
public interest should not be accepted when the main goal of its measures was to
27
reduce an energy tariff deficit which was, at least in part, its own fault.' While
international investment law is not supposed to force countries to keep in place
subsidy programs that are inefficient and unintended in their consequences,
renewable energy investors may legitimately expect the maintenance of an
"economic equilibrium", at least in terms of the viability of their business. 128
tribunals find that revocation measures constitute a breach of legitimate
expectations and, hence, a violation of the fair and equitable treatment standard,

118. Boute, supranote 4, at 364; Mejia, supranote 47, at 131.
119.

DOLZER, supra note 20, at 134.

120. Dromgool & Enguix, supra note 47, at 405-08.
121. Id. at 409.
122. See, e.g., Saluka Investments BV (Neth.) v. Czech Republic (UNCITRAL), Partial Award, 1
305 (Perm. Ct. Arb., Mar. 17, 2006).
123. Boute, CombatingClimate Change, supra note 90, at 647-61; Patrizia, supranote 47, at 79.
124. DOLZER, supra note 20, at 148-49.
125. Boute, CombatingClimate Change, supranote 90, at 648.
126. Id.
127. Dromgool & Enguix, supranote 47, at 414.
128. Id. at 415.
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they may decide to award a compensation that takes into account the losses of the
investors, the inappropriate regulation of the state, and the financial limitations of
the country due to the crisis.129 Ultimately, arbitral tribunals have to balance the
legitimate and reasonable expectations of the investor against the right of states to
intervene in the public interest.13 0 Reality is in perennial flux. Arbitral tribunals
assess the suitability of the parties behavior to changing conditions, namely by
examining the reasonableness and correctness of the legal framework initially set
forth by the state and its interest in adjusting regulatory structures to new social
and economic conditions.131 In the end, disputing parties should demonstrate that
their expectations (either of maintenance of the economic mechanisms, or of their
adjustment to new conditions) are legitimate, and that implies that they are
anchored in the reality that surrounded the investment and supervening
developments.
IV.

CHARANNE v. SPAIN:

A FIRST VICTORY

FOR THE HOST STATE

To date, only one award has been rendered in disputes relating to alterations
to economic support programs in the renewable energy market.1 32 On January 21,
2016, the tribunal in Charanne and Construction Investments v. Spain ruled in
favor of the validity of the host state's regulatory changes.1 33 The case regarded the
legislation passed by Spain in 2010, scaling back the incentives offered to
investors in the photovoltaic sector. 134 The claimants alleged that such regulatory
measures breached the standards of protection provided for in the ECT, namely the
protection against expropriation and the fair and equitable treatment standard. 3 5
First, the investors argued that Spain, after having attracted its investment in
the area of solar photovoltaic generation through a series of government incentives,
changed the regulatory framework, thereby causing damages to the investments.1 36
The claimants submitted that the regulations introduced in 2010 had such a brutal
impact on the economic value of their investment that this reduction in value
constituted an indirect expropriation of the value and returns of the investment,
even though their ownership rights were not affected.' 3 7 Since the claimants'
investment was not in returns of the photovoltaic installations, but in shares in a
company that generated and sold electricity produced by photovoltaic solar plants,
the tribunal held that the measures taken had to totally or partially deprive the
129. Id.
130. Id. at 411-14.
131. Id.
132. See Charanne B.V. v. The Kingdom of Spain, Arb. No. 062/2012, Final Award (Jan. 21,
2016) [hereinafter Charanne B.V. v. Spain, Award].
133. The original award (in Spanish) and an English translation (by MENA Chambers) are
available at http://www.italaw.com/cases/2082. Charanne B.V. v. El Reino de Espafia, Arb. No.
062/2012, Laudo Final (Jan. 21, 2016); Charanne B.V. v. Spain, Award, supra note 132; see Bonaf6,
supra note 67, for an analysis of the award.
134. Charanne BV. v. Spain, Award, supranote 132, 1180, 96, 146, 148-49.
135. Charanne B.V. v. Spain, Award, supranote 132, T 277.
136. Charanne B.V. v. Spain, Award, supranote 132, 1 80.
137. Charanne B.V v. Spain, Award, supranote 132, 11 280, 283-84.
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claimants of their rights as shareholders in order to constitute indirect
expropriation.1 38 The tribunal found that claimants' essential complaint was a loss
of profitability of the photovoltaic installations, which in turn reduced the value of
their shares. 13 9 The tribunal emphasized that, notwithstanding the measures, the
investors continue to be shareholders in the company and that the company
continued to operate and earn revenue.' 40 Although the profitability had been
seriously affected, it was not as serious as to be characterized as an expropriation.
Tribunal simple diminution in value of shares cannot constitute an indirect
expropriation.141
The investors also argued that Spain's 2010 regulations constituted a failure
to create stable conditions for investments, including the obligation to accord fair
and equitable treatments, as they created a context of instability and lack of clarity
in the regulatory regime.1 42 In addition, claimants submitted that Spain's actions
caused them to have legitimate expectations that the regulatory regime would not
43
be modified, and that no contract with Spain was necessary to demonstrate this.1
The tribunal commenced its analysis by emphasizing that it was restrained by the
claimants' own pleadings, which expressly excluded the subsequent regulations
from the tribunal's consideration.'" As a result, it limited itself to considering only
the 2010 Regulations. The tribunal found that in that limited context, it was unable
to assess the evolution of the regulatory framework and thus unable to conclude
that Spain had breached its obligation to maintain regulatory stability under Article
10(1) of the ECT.1 45
In relation to the lack of clarity in the regulations, the tribunal noted that the
claimants had not alleged that there was anything ambiguous or difficult to
understand about the 2010 Regulations.1 4 6 As to the question of claimants'
legitimate expectations, the tribunal espoused the general principle of good faith in
international customary law that a state cannot induce an investor to make an
investment, generate legitimate expectations and then later ignore commitments
that generated those expectations.' 47 The Tribunal held that the legitimate
expectations on the part of the investor must: (a) be analyzed using an objective
standard (based on the circumstances), and not the mere subjective belief held by
an investor; (b) be reviewed according to the relevant circumstances, which were
48
those prevailing at the time the investment was made; and (c) be reasonable.1
Additionally, when determining whether the regulatory framework existing at the
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time the investment was made created legitimate expectations, the tribunal made
the following observations:
(a) A State is entitled to maintain a reasonable degree of regulatory
flexibility to respond to changing circumstances and the public
interest;1 49

(b) The fair and equitable treatment protection standard does not
contemplate that the law existing at the time the investment is made will
be frozen or will never change;

50

and

(c) An investor cannot have a legitimate expectation in the absence of a
specific commitment on the part of the State made specifically to the
investor(s) that existing regulations are immutable and will not be
modified in order to adapt to market needs and the public interest. 151
The tribunal found that the host state had not infringed investors' legitimate
expectations, because no specific commitments had been given to them.1 52 The
tribunal was of the view that neither the pre-2010 Regulations, nor the literature
distributed by the Spanish government to encourage investment could be seen as
specific commitments. 5 3 Furthermore, the tribunal found that although regulations
may have limited reach, in that they might be directed to a certain portion of the
population, this alone is not sufficient to elevate them to the status of a State's
specific commitment. 54 An example of a specific commitment to claimants may
have been in the form of a stabilization clause in the regulations or a declaration
for the benefit of the investors that the regulatory framework would not be
modified. 15 Finally, the tribunal opined that in order to determine whether there
had been a breach of the fair and equitable standard of treatment relating to
modifying regulations that had been in existence at the time of the creation of the
investment, an investor had to demonstrate that the regulations were made
irrationally, contrary to public interest or that they were disproportionately
applied.1 56

Although the 2010 Regulations could prejudice the interests of the electricity
generators, they were based on objective criteria and could not be considered
irrational or arbitrary.15 7 As the main functions of the 2010 Regulations were to try
to limit the tariff deficit, control the rising cost of electricity to the Spanish
consumer and implement safety measures in relation to the voltage in the system, it
could not be said that the 2010 Regulations were not applied in the public
interest.iss As a result, the tribunal found that the investors had not demonstrated a
149.
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breach of Spain's obligation to accord fair and equitable treatment.15 9
The arbitrator, Guido Santiago Tawil, issued a dissenting opinion on the issue
of the claimant's legitimate expectations.' Whilst he shared the majority's
position that the finding of a violation of an investor's legitimate expectations
should be based on an objective standard (and not the subjective view of the
investor at the time the investment is made), he believed that this must be done on
an analysis of the facts on a case by case basis.1 61 Specifically, he opined that a
finding that legitimate expectations had been created was not limited to situations
where there was a specific commitment, whether of contractual nature or based in
declarations or specific conditions granted by the host State.62 In Mr. Tawil's
view, legitimate expectations could also be derived from a host state's legal regime
existing at the time the investment is made.1 63 He noted that when an investor
fulfills all the current regulatory requirements in order to obtain a specific and
determinable benefit, a host State's subsequent disregard of the investment violates
his legitimate expectations.'
Mr. Tawil believes that Spain's special regulatory regime was specifically
designed to foster a strong incentive to invest (so that the state's objective in
promoting the industry could be fulfilled), and was directed to a precise group of
investors with the means to invest, on the basis that the investor could benefit from
the regime for a definite period of time. 165 He further noted that the existence of
these elements, namely, (i) rules created to foster investment in renewable energy,
directed at a specific number of possible investors, and (ii) a brief time period in
which the benefit was to be obtained, was sufficient to show that legitimate
expectations on the part of the Claimants.1 66 He found that once the claimants
made the investment and fulfilled all of the requirements to obtain the benefits,
then it did not seem legally acceptable to recognize the host State's prerogative to
modify or eliminate the benefit without any legal consequences.' 6 1 Mr. Tawil
disagreed with the tribunal that this was incompatible with a State's right to
modify its laws, as a State never loses that right.' 6 8 However, if in the process of
exercising that right, the State infringes legitimate expectations, he was of the view
69
that it should provide adequate compensation.1
159. Charanne B.V. v. Spain, Award, supranote 132, 1539.
160. Charanne B.V. v. The Kingdom of Spain, Arb. No. 062/2012 (Dec. 21, 2015) (Arb. Prof. Dr.
Guido Santiago Tawil, dissenting) [hereinafter Charanne B.V. v. Spain, Dissent]. Original (in Spanish)
and English translation (by MENA Chambers) are available at http://www.italaw.com/cases/2082.
Charanne B.V. c. El Reino de Espafia, Arb. No. 062/2012 (Dec. 21, 2015) (Arb. del Prof. Guido
Santiago Tawil, opini6n disidente).
161. Charanne B.V. v. Spain, Dissent, supra note 160,14.
162. Charanne B.V. v. Spain, Dissent, supra note 160,114-5.
163. Charanne B.V. v. Spain, Dissent, supra note 160,¶5.
164. Charanne B.V. v. Spain, Dissent, supra note 160, 12.
165. Charanne B.V. v. Spain, Dissent, supra note 160, In 7-8.
166. Charanne B.V. v. Spain, Dissent, supranote 160, 19.
167. Charanne B.V. v. Spain, Dissent, supranote 160, ¶ 10.
168. Charanne B.V. v. Spain, Dissent, supra note 160, 11.
169. Charanne B.V. v. Spain, Dissent, supra note 160,¶ 11.

2017

INVESTMENT ARBITRATION & RENEWABLE ENERGY POLICYMAKING

273

This award is the first decision regarding legislative alterations to economic
support programs in the renewable energy market.' 70 Although the award is only
binding for the disputing parties and not on arbitral tribunals in other pending
cases, it offers important insights into how standards of investment protection
might be interpreted and applied in similar disputes. The majority's decision is
consistent with other arbitral tribunals' findings regarding the requirements for
indirect expropriation or violations of legitimate expectations.' 7 ' The decision also
addresses the circumstances in which, in the absence of a specific undertaking, a
host country may exercise its sovereign right to regulate without violating its
international investment law obligations.172 Since Spain had not made any specific
commitments to the investors with respect to the stability of the incentives regime,
the investors could not have expected that the renewable incentives regulatory
framework would remain unchanged for the lifetime of a photovoltaic plant.' 73 In
the tribunal's view, the obligation to provide fair and equitable treatment to foreign
investors under the ECT does not require freezing regulatory frameworks or
limiting changes to regulations.1 74 The arbitral panel held that investors did not
demonstrate any principle of international law that prohibits a state from imposing
new rules when it never signed a contract stipulating otherwise.1 75 The tribunal
held that the changes introduced by Spain were reasonable, proportional, made in
the public interest, and not retroactive. 7 6 Such changes maintained all the
fundamental characteristics of the regulatory regime at the time of the investment,
namely the right to a subsidized tariff through the photovoltaic plant's life.' 77
An important aspect of the decision involves the relationship between
investors' expectations and due diligence. In a highly regulated industry such as
energy, investors must exhaustively analyze the applicable framework before they
make their investment.
It is necessary to carry out a due diligence analysis of the
legal framework of the host country on the part of the investors, in order to shape
expectations. 179 The tribunal found that an investor had a duty to conduct due
diligence of the legal framework of the investments, and that if the claimants
would have done so, they should have expected the possibility of changes to the

170. Bonaf6, supra note 67, at 174-75.
171. See CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, Award, 1 277
(May 12, 2005); Continental Casualty Co. v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/9, Award, ¶ 258
(Sept. 5, 2008); Electrabel S.A. v. Hungary, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/19, Award, pt. VII, 1 7 (Nov. 25,
2015).
172. Charanne B.V. v. Spain, Award, supra note 132, ¶ 500.
173. Charanne B.V. v. Spain, Award, supra note 132, ¶ 499.
174. Charanne B.V. v. Spain, Award, supra note 132, JI¶ 503-04.
175. Charanne B.V. v. Spain, Award, supra note 132, 1548.
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regulatory regime.'so In the words of the tribunal:
At least that is the level of care that would be expected of a foreign
investor in a highly regulated as the energy sector, where a preliminary
and comprehensive legal framework applicable to the sector analysis is
8
essential to proceed with the investment.'
The degree of investor diligence operates as a factual or interpretive element
in light of which the appropriateness of State action is to be assessed or, relatedly,
82
the scope of protection of investment protection standards is to be determined.'
From this perspective, investor diligence is a key consideration in assessing the
"reasonableness" or "legitimacy" of the expectations that could potentially be
83
"[I]nvestors have a due
protected by the fair and equitable treatment clause.'
diligence obligation, which covers not only. . .the basic regulations applicable to
foreign investment transactions.. but also.. .the entire legal framework potentially
applicable to the investment, and even. . .the potential changes of such framework
84
that are foreseeable at the time the investment is made."'
While the Charanne award offers important lessons, it should be stressed that
it focused only on the 2010 legislative changes, and did not take into consideration
85
In fact, the more significant
further changes introduced to the legal framework.'
are the subject separate
2010
legislative amendments introduced by Spain after
86
not be seen as decisive
should
award
claims filed more recently.' As a result, this
Spain.' 87 According to
against
for the outcome of the other renewable energy cases
cases will be in the
in
these
Behn, the key to understanding the outcomes
88
distinctions between when the claims were initiated and against which state.' The
earlier cases will probably be claiming violations of the ECT according to very
different legislative and regulatory changes compared to the later cases. The timing
of claim initiation will be critical and is likely to create substantial differences in
outcomes.' 89 It is also likely for later claims to be more successful, as they are be
based on the more severe regulatory changes.' 90 Referring to the Charanne award,
180. Charanne B.V. v. Spain, Award, supranote 132,1 507.
181. Charanne B.V. v. Spain, Award, supranote 132, 1507.
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Arguments, in GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW AND INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT ARBITRATION:
SOURCES AND ARGUMENTS (Andrea Gattini ed.) (forthcoming 2016).
183. Id
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185. Charanne B.V. v. Spain, Award, supranote 132, In 481-83.
186. See list of disputes supra note 55.
187. Ramona Volciuc-lonescu, Energy Charter Treaty Claims: Spain Wins First Solar Case in
Arbitration, LEXOLOGY (Jan. 28, 2016), http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g-56483dbfaa32-4f52-a415-1 f52492ad218.
188. Daniel Behn, Spain Wins FirstPV Solar Arbitration:A Word of Caution in Using this Case to
PredictOutcome in the more than Three Dozen Cases to Come, U. OSLO: PLURICOURTS BLOG (Jan. 27,
2016, 9:43 AM), http://www.jus.uio.no/pluricourts/english/blog/daniel-friedrich-behn/2016-01-26arbitration-spain.htrnl.
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190. Id; 3 Takeaways From the First Spanish Solar Arbitration Award, GLOBAL INVESTMENT
PROTECTION (Feb. 2, 2016), http://www.globalinvestmentprotection.com/index.php/3-takeaways-from-
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Behn argues that it would have been unreasonable to expect - absent a specific
contractual guarantee between the investor and the state - that the regulatory and
legislative environment governing solar projects would remain static and
9
completely unchanged for the life of the project.m
' However, the author believes
that legislative changes introduced later on, namely in 2013 and 2014, are more
likely to be considered as breaches of the ECT.' 92
The outcome of the Charanne case is an important victory for host states like
Spain who face several claims before international tribunals on fairly similar
facts. 1 93 This is the first decision that analyzes the key problems arising from
changes to economic support mechanisms and helps to shed some light on the
validity of such measures under international law. However, it should be kept in
mind that other respondent states like the Czech Republic and Bulgaria have
adopted slightly different types of measures. Therefore, the takeaways from this
award cannot simply be applied automatically and fully to the other solar energy
disputes. 194 For now, the major lesson offered by the Charanne award is that a
breach of international investment treaties in this context will not be as straightforward as some investors may have initially imagined. 195
V.

IMPLICATIONS FOR RENEWABLE ENERGY POLICYMAKING

Energy projects entail large-scale, long-term capital investments. Because
renewable energies are not mature technologies, their development depends upon
public support. Economic support mechanisms need to be maintained in the form
presented at the time the investment is made in order for it to be profitable. 196
Investment decisions in the energy market are surrounded by risks of ex post
regulatory changes by the host state. Feed-in tariffs and similar economic support
mechanisms paved the way for the expansion of the market for green energy but
became a victim of their own success. In response to overgrowth within the
market, several countries have decided to scale down, or eliminate, such incentives
after the investment costs were already sunk. 197 In times of financial crunch feedtariffs become especially easy targets because they are more visible than other
government subsidies.1 98

-

the-first-spanish-solar-arbitration-award.
191. Behn, supra note 188.
192. Id.
193. See list of cases supranote 66.
194. 3 Takeaways From the First Spanish Solar ArbitrationAward, supranote 190.
195. Behn, supranote 188.
196. Edna Sussman, The Energy Charter Treaty's Investor Protection Provisions: Potential to
Foster Solutions to Global Warming and Promote Sustainable Development, in SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT [N WORLD INVESTMENT LAW 515, 528 (Marie-Claire Segger et al. eds., 2011).

197. Sussman, supra note 196.
198. Victor Mallet, Shadow Falls across Spanish solar energy industry, FINANCIAL TIMES (June 1,
2010,
3:00
AM),
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/9ec9al38-6dl5-Ildf-921a00144feab49a.html?ft site=falcon&desktop-true#axzz4RL9y7LFM; Leah Stokes, The Politics of
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497 (2013).
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'

Changes to regulatory frameworks might have a significant impact on what
until recently seemed like an unstoppable move towards a low-carbon model of
development, jeopardizing the credibility of renewable energy policies and
generating high investment uncertainty.'19 These measures may affect the support
for renewable energy in both the present and future. Governments may cut agreed
subsidies for projects built or under construction but also decide not to grant any
support for new projects.2 0 If investors have the perception that governments
might act opportunistically and change the "rules of the game" after the investment
has been made, they will most likely factor in a risk premium in future projects,
20
increasing the costs of eco-friendly policies.
Changes introduced by several countries to their economic support
2 02
Foreign
mechanisms have triggered a wave of international arbitral proceedings.
profitability
the
reduce
they
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claiming
investors are challenging such measures
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fair
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from
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can
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of
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frustrating an investor's
expectations are
reasonable
legitimate,
and
the impact on investors' rights
based on public
actions
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economic
short-term
or
constraints
budgetary
policy considerations- such as
206
harm.
The network of international investment agreements built over the past few
decades has fundamentally altered the legal framework for investors and host
states in the energy sector. 207 Furthermore, the resort to the investor-state
arbitration mechanism for the settlement of disputes gave arbitration panels a role
199.

Energy 2020: A Strategyfor Competitive, Sustainable and Secure Energy, at 9, COM (2010)

http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal2010),
10,
(Nov.
final
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content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52010DC0639&from=EN; A Comparative Analysis, supra note
13, at 174; DEL RIO, supra note 47, at 21.
200. Mallet, supra note 198; Gerard Marata et al., Renewable Energy Incentives in the United
States and Spain: Different Paths - Same Destination?,28(4) J. OF ENERGY AND NAT. RESOURCES L.

481, 499 (2010).
201.

Boute, CombatingClimate Change, supra note 90, at 615.

202. See list of cases supranote 66.
203. See JOHN A. VANDUZER ET AL., INTEGRATING SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT INTO
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS 10 (2013) (describing investor concerns over the risk of
arbitrary and discriminatory treatment by host states).
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to play in national and international energy policymaking. Arbitral tribunals
perform a supranational review of state acts, scrutinizing the conduct of public
entities against the standards of treatment prescribed in international investment
agreements. 2 08 The outcome of these proceedings may limit the future legislative
and administrative freedom of maneuver of states, affecting their ability to pursue
public welfare policies. 209 Investor-state arbitration panels have been dealing with
a greater amount of energy disputes, and particularly climate-related issues. While
some years ago investors were claiming that states had enacted environmentfriendly regulations in a way that was detrimental to their investments, the new
wave of disputes refers to cases were states are reducing or eliminating the
economic incentives which they introduced years ago in order to encourage
investments in the renewable energy market. 210 This new category of disputes
basically results from the move from the old to the new production matrix.2 1 In
both sets of cases, the protections afforded to foreign investors by international
investment agreements have the potential to interfere in domestic decision-making
on climate-related issues. International investment agreements protect investors in
general, both those who invest in renewable-energy projects and those who invest
in carbon-intensive industries. Both scenarios will most likely feature in future
investment arbitration proceedings.212
Arbitral tribunals in charge of settling renewable energy disputes have a
complex task ahead of them. As final awards are rendered, they have the potential
to provide guidance for pending cases and similar disputes that will surely arise in
the future,2 13 further defining the parameters of the host states' regulatory powers
with respect to renewable energy investments. 2 14 "[U]nderstanding how arbitrators
are giving effect to the protections for investors, while at the same time balancing
the interests of host states to regulate in the public interest," will play a decisive
role in future renewable energy policymaking. 2 1 5
Tribunals will have to balance the expectations of investors against the right
of states to intervene in the public interest and adjust regulatory structures
according to the specific circumstances that surround those cases. This assessment
will likely focus on whether governments act with consistency, transparency, and
reasonableness when modifying or eliminating the existing incentives regime, and,
above all, whether investors have reasonable and legitimate expectations that were
breached as a result of the state's measures. 216

208. Id. at 209.
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211. Jorge E. Vifluales, Foreign Investment and the Environment in International Law: The
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Miles ed.) (forthcoming 2016).
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As divergent interpretations persist about when the investors' expectations
deserve protection under the fair and equitable treatment standard, any evaluation
will be deeply dependent upon the specific circumstances and facts of each
particular case. 217 Past arbitral practice allows for diverging interpretations of the
existing investment standards. This divergence is explained by three different
reasons. "First, different international investment agreements adopt different
languages and formulate investment standards in diverse ways.. 218 Second, these
legal instruments normally have a wide scope of application and are not
219
[Lastly],
specifically designed for investments in a particular area or industry.
22 0
Arbitral tribunals
there is no. . . binding precedent in investment arbitration."
can interpret the applicable investment treaties differently and apply them to the
22
specific facts of the case according to their own appreciation. 1 This underlines the
importance of the specific nature and circumstances of each dispute for the
decision. While international investment tribunals do not create precedent that is
binding upon other tribunals, some of the standards of investor protection are
actually primarily shaped by prior rulings and not by reference to other sources of
222
international law or state practice.
Investment treaty arbitration has developed a
223
Still, the
strong, albeit persuasive - that is, non-binding - system of precedent.
approach of different international investment arbitrators to similar issues can vary
considerably, creating a degree of uncertainty regarding the outcome of
22 4
international investment disputes.
This lack of certainty raises the question of the necessity to create a specific
investment regime for low-carbon investments. The last decades witnessed the
225
emergence of what can be called "International Energy Investment Law",
mainly composed of bilateral investment treaties and the ECT. These international
instruments afforded a certain degree of certainty and security to investors,
significantly increasing the availability of funds for investment in renewable
energy projects.226 Against a background of financial crisis, the present wave of
disputes makes the call for a widely adopted multi-lateral energy investment treaty
all the more urgent. Investment treaty analysis and climate change concerns have
developed since the drafting of the ECT and political changes and realignments
have occurred which may require some fine-tuning or adjustments in the ECT
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provisions. 227

The Energy Charter Secretariat has been discussing the benefits of a nonbinding declaration and/or an interpretative note on the promotion of low-carbon
investments. 228 It is argued that such a statement would improve legal certainty in
the application of the ECT, reducing the normative and political risks and
investment related disputes. 229 Moreover, a clear political statement on low-carbon
investments by the Energy Charter Conference would send an important signal to
the international community and to investors on its commitment to sustainable
development and climate change mitigation. The overall objective being the
protection and balance the interests of ECT members and of international
investors. 230
Some authors go farther and argue that the current system is problematic, as it
allows foreign investors to initiate arbitration against the host state without having
first consulted and received some sort of an authorization from their home
government.2 3' In the cases against Spain, it is reported that a number of foreign
states have notified the Spanish authorities, more or less officially, of their concern
regarding the commercial interests of their nationals.2 32 From this perspective,
foreign investors should first seek at least the opinion of its home government, and
preferably its assent, before initiating an international conflict that can grow well
beyond the economic dispute that originated it. The relative lack of practical effect
of many investor-state disputes calls into question whether state-to-state dispute
settlement would be more efficient. 233
In the European context, economic support mechanisms for the promotion of
renewable energy have led not only to the wave of investment arbitration but also
to market distortions and state aid investigations.234 According to Behn and
Fauchald, this is the result of two major sets of conditions. 235 On the one hand,
external conditions, namely, the global financial recession and the unanticipated
227. Id. at 532.
228. See Energy Charter Secretariat, Energy Charter 2013 Annual Report 25-26,
http://www.energycharter.org/fileadmin/DocumentsMedia/AR/AR_2013_en.pdf (last accessed Dec. 10,
2015); see also Energy Charter Secretariat, Energy Charter 2014 Annual Report 19,
http://www.energycharter.org/fileadmin/DocumentsMedia/AR/AR_2014-en.pdf (last accessed Dec. 10,
2015).
229. See Energy Charter Secretariat, Energy Charter 2013 Annual Report 25-26,
http://www.energycharter.org/fileadmin/DocumentsMedia/AR/AR_2013_en.pdf (last accessed Dec. 10,
2015); see also Energy Charter Secretariat, Energy Charter 2014 Annual Report 19,
http://www.energycharter.org/fileadmin/DocumentsMedia/AR/AR_2014_en.pdf (last accessed Dec. 10,
2015).
230. Energy Charter2013 Annual Report, supranote 228, at 26.
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232. Id.
233. Ramon Torrent et al., Reforming the Present InternationalLegal Frameworkfor Foreign
Direct Investment (FDI): Basic Elements for an Analytical and Policy Framework 6-7 (Legal Studies
Research
Paper
No.
2015-25,
2015),
available
at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfin7abstract-id=2570596.
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236
On the other hand, an internal condition - the
decline in the cost of solar panels.
regulatory structure established to implement support schemes. While the external
conditions were unanticipated, regulatory structures were inflexible and unable to
237
Because investments were
quickly respond to changing market conditions.
originally over-incentivized, when regulators and legislators realized that feed-in
tariffs were unsustainable, it was too late and drastic emergency-type measures
238
were required to control new investment in the sector.
This is recognized by the European Commission itself, who has stated that:

[R]igid national support schemes were generally unable to adapt rapidly
enough to . .. falling costs, raising profits and creating a rate and scale
of installations in some countries almost excessive in a time of general
economic crisis. The result has been sudden and unpredictable changes
to a number of national support schemes, which will . . . curtail
investment .. 239

The European Commission recognizes that:
Given the prominent role that financial support schemes play in
developing renewable energy today, and given the growing prominence
(and cost) of renewable energy use in the electricity sector, urgent
efforts are needed to reform support schemes to ensure that they are
designed in a cost effective, market-oriented manner. The Commission's
guidance is necessary to ensure that support schemes are adjusted
regularly and quickly enough to take account of falling technology costs
and to ensure reforms make renewable energy producers part of the
energy market . .. to ensure such market interventions are correcting
market failures and not adding or maintaining market distortions ...
Many national reforms have had a negative impact on the investment
climate. Most critical have been changes that reduce the return on
investments already made. Such changes alter the legitimate
expectations of business and clearly discourage investment, at a time
240
when significantly more investment is needed.
The European Commission's concern with renewable energy disputes is
241
In
eloquently evidenced by its own involvement in the arbitral proceedings.

Charanneand ConstructionInvestments v. Spain, the European Commission was
permitted to file an amicus curiae brief.2 4 2 The European Commission is also

243
reported to have sought leave to intervene in other proceedings against Spain
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and the Czech Republic, 2 44 but there is no further information available. Nondisputing party applications have been filed to intervene in other energy-related
ICSID cases against Spain 245 and Italy, 24 6 yet it remains unclear whether the
European Commission has filed these applications.
The European Commission seeks authorization to take part in the arbitral
proceedings in order to clarify issues concerning the scope and content of
European Law, which are connected to the disputes. Being the "Guardian of the
Treaties", the European Commission possesses a vested interest in becoming
involved in such arbitrations and helping the tribunal to elucidate potential
conflicts of legal rules and principles.24 7 In the different proceedings against the
Czech Republic being arbitrated under the UNCITRAL Rules, the European
Commission is reported to have raised a conflict with the provisions of European
Union Law. According to the Commission, former benefits and incentives
accorded to solar investors could constitute state aid that needed to be eliminated
in order for the Czech Republic to remain in compliance with European Union
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law. 24 8 The intervention of the European Commission in the proceedings may,
naturally, raise the technical complexity of the proceedings due to the potential
conflict between obligations arising under BITs and under European Union law.249
Greater policy coordination between the European Union and its member
states is needed. 25 0 The European Commission is currently working to devise a
2 51
In this regard, the design of
European policy on renewable energy promotion.
support schemes is of paramount importance. While economic support
mechanisms have demonstrated important successes, they have also evidenced a
number of policy failures. 2 52 Feed-in tariffs are useful support mechanisms, but
should not be irreversible. These tools must inevitably adapt to changing
circumstances, namely varying costs. However, this is no easy task. Governments
may face significant political resistance if they decide to change or terminate feedin tariffs. Investors always resist any change to regulatory structures that affects
these mechanisms and impacts their investments. As incentives become a key
piece in the overall system, the renewables industry may gain more political
2 53
suasion, making the problem even harder to solve.
The current wave of disputes may be the consequence of insufficient planning
and administrative capabilities. It should be seen as a serious warning for
governments to act cautiously when implementing policies that may have
254
Governments need to
important implications for international investment.
understand renewable energy policies in general - and financial support
mechanisms in particular - as a permanent exercise of re-evaluation and readaptation. Markets change continuously, and so does the market for renewable
energy sources. Policies need to adapt accordingly. The challenge is for
policymakers to adjust quickly and adequately to ever-changing markets in order
to maximize their regulatory frameworks' efficacy and efficiency. Governments
should be aware that making long-term commitments to attract investment may
result in expensive international arbitration claims in the future. Feed-in tariffs
must be designed prudently to allow for flexibility when market conditions change.
Well-designed schemes are in the best interest of both govermments and investors,
because the alternative is an explosion of disputes where everyone loses except the
arbitration industry.2 55 Governments should factor in some flexibility into the
regulatory structure so as to eliminate the risk of legitimate policy decisions giving
rise to legal disputes, while at the same time providing adequate assurances to
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investors. 256 Policymakers need to design feed-in tariff schemes that are flexible
enough to accommodate changes in the market without disrupting the stability of
the regime itself. Those who fail to strike this balance risk regulatory collapse. 257
Nevertheless, it should also be added that regulatory risks associated with
renewable energy investment are also evolving. As renewable energy develops and
matures, its costs will sooner or later fall below the price of conventionally
produced electricity. Once this "tipping point" has been reached, feed-in tariffs
will have delivered their promise, and will only be needed on a limited basis, if at
all. 258 As a result, they will be increasingly unnecessary to entice investment in
renewable energies. When this moment comes, investment disputes resulting from
the elimination of such incentives will disappear as well.259
Disagreements in the international energy industry normally lead to high
profile disputes. Once a controversy arises, parties seek to exhaust all options to
reach a settlement before resorting to arbitration. Many disputes are amicably
settled before an arbitral award is rendered. The cases that do reach the award
stage are more likely to reflect investor-state relationships that are beyond
repair.260 The astounding amount of disputes currently pending before arbitral
tribunals signals a failure by governments in adjusting their regulatory structures
without destabilizing the market for renewable energies. Regardless of the final
outcome of these disputes, they indicate a significant level of conflict between host
states and investors. Monitoring the evolution of these disputes is especially
difficult since part of the information is confidential or otherwise unavailable. 261
Whether parties will be able to avoid further confrontation and reach to reasonable
settlements remains to be seen.
In any case, it is important to ensure that bridges between states and investors
are not burned. The transition to a low-carbon model of development requires
long-term cooperation between parties.2 62 Countries will continue to strive to
design and implement energy policies that allow them to face climate change.
Investors are essential partners in this process, and governments need to be able to
encourage them to make their contribution in future ventures. In designing new
policies or adjusting existing ones, governments need to take into account that the
legal framework that supports renewable energy investment is not confined to
national regulations. The legal obligations borne by states towards investors
encompass obligations in domestic law (contract and administrative law) but also
in international law, namely international investment law.2 63 The challenge for
governments is to strike a balance between regulation that discourages foreign
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investment and foreign investment protection that discourages regulation.264
Countries need to adopt a holistic approach to renewable energy
policymaking so as to avoid possible clashes between different legal frameworks.
The different layers of regulation applicable to investments in renewable energies
all serve to protect investments in this field. Legal instruments, international
investment law in particular, can help to mobilize the huge investments required to
265
The challenge is to
transform the energy sector to cleaner forms of generation.
foreign investors
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Investment standards of protection may have a chilling effect on the domestic
regulatory space. While in the past concerns have been voiced that arbitration
awards could end up crystallizing environmentally detrimental rules, now they
may ultimately have an environmentally friendly freezing effect. Governments
should be cognizant of the commitments that they undertake under international
investment treaties. In particular, the fair and equitable treatment standard narrows
down the discretionary space of host states.267 Its application may inhibit necessary
adjustments and changes in the legal framework, which the investor did not expect
268
The
or which are seen as irrational or unjustifiable by the investment tribunals.
risk that host state measures may conflict with investment-backed expectations
may, however, be substantially reduced by governments if they ensure regulatory
transparency and due process.2 69
States can also reduce the risk of overly broad interpretations of investment
disciplines by using more precise language in new investment agreements or
include explicit language that allows them to justify changes to regulatory
frameworks by reference to broad social or environmental objectives. However,
both of these measures only apply to future disputes. As for existing international
investment agreements, states can provide authoritative interpretive guidance as to
the terms of the treaty. A good example of this approach is the interpretive note
issued by the three member-states to the North American Free Trade Agreement
270
(NAFTA) in relation to the fair and equitable treatment standard.

264.
265.

CONDON, supra note 18, at 93.
CONDON, supra note 18, at 93.

266. Id.
267. Krajewski, supranote 79.
268. Id. at 360.
269. Asa Romson, International Investment Law and the Environment, in SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT IN WORLD INVESTMENT LAW 37, 40 (Marie-Claire Segger et al. eds., 2011).
270. North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), Notes ofInterpretationofCertain Chapter
11 Provisions, GLOBAL AFFAIRS CANADA, http://www.intemational.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-

commerciaux/topics-domaines/disp-diff/nafta-interpr.aspx?lang-eng (last accessed Dec. 10, 2015).

2017

INVESTMENT ARBITRATION

& RENEWABLE

ENERGY POLICYMAKING

285

The numerous claims over changes in economic support mechanisms that
have surfaced in the past few years provide evidence that states to rethink and
reshape their renewable energy policies. The determination of what is reasonable
for the investor to expect is important for any reform of legal frameworks. Shifts in
both policy and the development of countries make this determination different
from country to country. 271 The creation of efficient and sustainable markets for
renewable sources of energy is a tremendous financial and legal challenge. This
endeavor can only be achieved through a thorough knowledge of the functioning
and possible implications of the economic mechanisms and legal frameworks that
underpin foreign investments in the renewable energy market.

271.

Romson, supra note 269, at 40.
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